This symposium will explore and critically assess foundational issues in cognition (/psychology) from a non-anthropocentric perspective. A non-anthropocentric psychology is an understanding of psychological phenomena in general (and not just perceptual capacities) in a way that does not take the human case as the criterion for possession of a real or full-blooded capacity. It is also a way of explaining psychological phenomena using methods that are neutral regarding the nature of the target explananda, such as mathematical modeling. The symposium brings together philosophical consideration of discrete research areas that have individually raised questions about the anthropocentric tradition. These include (inter alia) developments in machine learning, the increasing use of cognitive frameworks to explain the behavior of plants, bacteria, and other far-from-human species, and the mathematical modeling of human social interactions and collective action. When Turing asked "Do computers think?", he began his answer by making the question more specific and then proposing a human-language-based criterion for thinking. Seventy-odd years later, we are able to revisit the question of what it is to think from the broader perspective provided by significant advances in neuroscience, biology, psychology, comparative ethology, computer science, and network science.
Issaquah B (Third Floor)PSA2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Associationoffice@philsci.org
This symposium will explore and critically assess foundational issues in cognition (/psychology) from a non-anthropocentric perspective. A non-anthropocentric psychology is an understanding of psychological phenomena in general (and not just perceptual capacities) in a way that does not take the human case as the criterion for possession of a real or full-blooded capacity. It is also a way of explaining psychological phenomena using methods that are neutral regarding the nature of the target explananda, such as mathematical modeling. The symposium brings together philosophical consideration of discrete research areas that have individually raised questions about the anthropocentric tradition. These include (inter alia) developments in machine learning, the increasing use of cognitive frameworks to explain the behavior of plants, bacteria, and other far-from-human species, and the mathematical modeling of human social interactions and collective action. When Turing asked "Do computers think?", he began his answer by making the question more specific and then proposing a human-language-based criterion for thinking. Seventy-odd years later, we are able to revisit the question of what it is to think from the broader perspective provided by significant advances in neuroscience, biology, psychology, comparative ethology, computer science, and network science.
A Slippery Slope to Plant Minds and Bacterial Cognition? Philosophy of Science09:00 AM - 09:20 AM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/03 16:00:00 UTC - 2018/11/03 16:20:00 UTC
Colin Allen (University of Pittsburgh) Advocates of non-representationalist models of cognition frequently tout their extension to organisms traditionally regarded as unminded or noncognitive. They bring at least two kinds of considerations to bear. One set is empirical: traditionally non-minded organisms (TNMOs) are more complex and more similar to TMOs (traditionally minded organisms) than previously recognized. The other set is theoretical: the lines traditionally drawn between TMOs and TNMOs depend on questionable, anthropocentric, (neo-)Cartesian assumptions. I will survey the options and assess whether stepping away from representationalism inexorably leads to the conclusion that plants really have minds and bacteria are cognitive systems.
Moral Psychology in Robots and Rodents Philosophy of Science09:20 AM - 09:40 AM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/03 16:20:00 UTC - 2018/11/03 16:40:00 UTC
Kristin Andrews (York University) This presentation will bring together recent discussions of moral practice, judgment, and decision making in artificial agents such as autonomous cars and nonhuman animals such as rats. I will examine arguments in favor of considering nonhuman animals as having a kind of moral practice, and apply the most plausible accounts of animal moral psychology to a learning and developmental model for autonomous machines — machines that we can be comfortable unleashing upon the public.
The Comparative Psychology of Artificial Intelligences: Anthropomorphism and Anthropocentrism in Deep Learning's "Interpretation Problem" Philosophy of Science09:40 AM - 10:00 AM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/03 16:40:00 UTC - 2018/11/03 17:00:00 UTC
Cameron Buckner (University of Houston) This presentation will focus on the way anthropomorphism/anthropocentrism interface in attempts to solve the "interpretation problem" facing deep learning neural networks. For example, researchers have begun using methods to correlate network performance with verbal justifications recorded from human subjects reaching a similar outcome in a similar situation. Worries of anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism should be considered here, however, given that the justifications are generated ad hoc using powerful statistical methods, rather than playing a causal role in the networks' "decisions". Much could be learned by reviewing methodological considerations from comparative psychology and the psychology of human introspection.
Explaining and Exploring Plant Intelligence and Subjective Awareness Philosophy of Science10:15 AM - 10:45 AM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/03 17:15:00 UTC - 2018/11/03 17:45:00 UTC
Paco Calvo (University of Murcia) My talk introduces plant intelligence in terms of neo-Gibsonian ecological psychology and embodied cognitive science. Plants take action in response to their needs. We may understand how plants perceive and act purposefully in terms of the coupling of an embodied system that is embedded in its environment. On another note, plants have a nerve-like vascular system that forms a complex information-processing network (Calvo, Sahi & Trewavas 2017). Considering that consciousness appears to play a role in prioritizing the order of an organism's responses, my talk explores the possibility of plant subjective awareness, provided that vascular networks determine priority of responses.
Non-Anthropocentric Psychology and the Grounds of Moral Status Philosophy of Science10:45 AM - 11:15 AM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/03 17:45:00 UTC - 2018/11/03 18:15:00 UTC
Carrie Figdor (University of Iowa) This paper will consider two fundamental questions that a non-anthropocentric psychology raises for our understanding of full moral status, which is traditionally based on cognition and not just the ability to feel pain. Without an anthropocentric presupposition about the nature of these capacities, we must reconsider the relation between moral status and cognition, and claim by humans to possess the highest status based on their cognitive capacities. I consider whether cognition should maintain its role as criterion of moral status, and the extent to which non-anthropocentrism changes how we assess and distribute moral status.
Anthropocentric Bias in Theories of Group Cognition Philosophy of Science11:15 AM - 11:45 AM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/03 18:15:00 UTC - 2018/11/03 18:45:00 UTC
Georg Theiner (Villanova University) Canvassing the extant literature on group cognition, I reveal the influence of anthropocentric bias with respect to 1) the presupposition that a robust account of group cognition ought to show that groups are minded in the same sense (although not necessarily to the same degree) that individual human beings are; 2) the type of cognitive architecture which is taken to be required for constituting a cognitive system; 3) the characterization of intelligent behavior which the workings of a cognitive system are meant to explain; and 4) the criteria that are used for demarcating the boundaries of a cognitive system.
