Jean Baccelli (Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy)
The representational theory of measurement (RTM) has long been the central paradigm in the philosophy of measurement. Such is not the case anymore, partly under the influence of the critique according to which it offers too poor descriptions of the measurement procedures actually followed in science. This can be called the metrological critique of RTM. Assessing this critique matters not only because the correct interpretation of RTM’s research program is at stake. It matters also because the metrological viewpoint, now dominant in the philosophy of measurement, risks to overly restrict the kind of questions explored in this field. My main claim is that, contrary to what is presupposed by the metrological critique, it is not RTM’s goal to offer descriptions of the measurement procedures actually followed in science. To support this claim, I present various cases where RTM can be said to investigate measurement without specifying any measurement procedure. I argue that such limit cases reveal that the metrological critique rests upon a misinterpretation of RTM. I also explain that they illustrate the kind of questions which the philosophy of measurement can explore, when it is not bounded by the metrological viewpoint.
