Abstract Summary
Rachel Ankeny (University of Adelaide), Sabina Leonelli (University of Exeter) - It is widely acknowledged that models come in an endless variety of forms, a combination of which is always required by their use in scientific practice. Given this dramatic diversity, much attention has been paid to the actual features of models employed in scientific practice in order to clarify the epistemological status of each type of model as both a product of and a tool used for scientific theorizing (e.g., Weisberg 2013; Levy and Currie 2015; Frigg and Nguyen 2016). Relatively less attention has been devoted to the variety of activities, such as extrapolation, that need to be performed to yield models that can be defined as ‘good’ or ‘adequate’ (cf. Steel 2008; Knuuttila 2011; Baetu 2016). Examining modelling activities, rather than their products, is a particularly useful approach when trying to understand how experimental organisms help to create knowledge that can be projected beyond the immediate domain in which it was produced, and particularly what makes such projections more (or less) plausible. This question is especially significant given that organisms often are taken as models for phenomena that are arguably not directly observable in the organisms themselves (e.g., the use of mice to explore alcoholism in humans) or for organisms that are very dissimilar to them (e.g., the use of yeast as models for cancer in humans). In this paper, we argue that the plausibility of organisms as models relates to the ways in which they fit (or fail to fit) a given research repertoire, which in turn defines the expectations and constraints of the research community in question. We thus provide a philosophical framework to understand the epistemic grounds on which researchers endow models with representational power, the extent to which such endowment is viewed as fruitful and plausible–or problematic and unrealistic–by others, and the implications of such assessments for what is perceived as ‘successful’ research practice. This analysis also illustrates one way in which adopting the framework of repertoires can help address long-standing questions within the philosophy of science.
