Abstract Summary
Jeremy Heis (University of California, Irvine) - Ernst Cassirer, like all of the “classical” Neo-Kantians, characterized his philosophy of science as a kind of “idealism.” Although many contemporary philosophers have identified affinities between their own philosophies of science and Cassirer's, few if any philosophers today defend “idealism” in the philosophy of science. In this talk, I answer the question: What did Cassirer mean by calling his philosophy of science “idealism”? In particular, I argue that there are four distinct senses of “idealism” in Cassirer's philosophy of science: idealism about "method," idealism about "content," idealism of "a priori principles," and idealism about "objectivity." These four senses of idealism are opposed, respectively, to naturalism, sensualism, empiricism, and realism. I illustrate each of these senses of idealism with different aspects of Cassirer's philosophy of mathematics and natural science. Moreover, some of these four senses of idealism are quite modest, and some are widely held, even by philosophers who would not describe themselves as “idealists.” Last, I identify the sense in which Cassirer's philosophy of the Geisteswissenschaften is "idealistic."
