Abstract Summary
Evelyn Brister (Rochester Institute of Technology) - Direct interaction with scientists and engineers is not new for philosophers of science; it is a disciplinary norm to understand scientific practice, and, frequently, to consult with scientists on our projects. However, it is rather less common to contribute philosophical analysis to the science-relevant work of others, which is what we call “fieldwork.” When doing field philosophy, we become integrated on a scientific team, we assist practitioners or community groups in developing a philosophically-informed outlook, or we consult on matters of scientific or medical policy. Opportunities for these forms of engaged work are likely to grow (Frodeman et al. 2013, Tuana 2010), and yet there are several barriers that limit involvement. I will address three concerns that limit opportunities to do fieldwork. First, I will address obstacles related to collaboration. Philosophers are trained to construct and critique arguments but not trained as carefully in collaborative skills or building relationships with non-philosophers. Second, we expect projects to fit academic time frames: flexible deadlines and done in a year or two. However, when working with policymakers or community groups, work is often required at times when others need it, not when our teaching schedules most allow it, and fruitful collaborations often require an investment of many years. This may mean that an investment does not yield full benefits for a young researcher until post-tenure. Finally, field projects are highly contingent: they depend on political stability, policy priorities, the interest of private and corporate entities, and others’ funding streams—and our institutional expectations do not allow most of us to take on this kind of risk. Strategies to encourage fieldwork demand changing disciplinary norms. For instance, philosophy should expand its evaluative criteria to recognize the intellectual merit and difficulty of field projects. In addition, we should develop institutional outlets for reporting on fieldwork projects and for sharing strategies for crafting and pursuing them effectively. We should also advocate for strong university support for such projects, since these projects lead to strong relationships between universities and communities, and since they are commonly pursued by philosophers who contribute to diversity in the academy. Finally, we can do more to call attention to the philosophical skills that suit philosophers to such projects: experience at abstracting away from detail and identifying high-level classifications, a willingness to bring together insights from disparate areas of inquiry, and skill in eliciting and guiding discussions of vision and values. Support for philosophical fieldwork is tied to the goals and insights of feminist philosophy of science. First, evidence shows that women students and researchers have a stronger interest in solving social problems than do their male counterparts. Second, many engaged projects have a gender or social justice component. As Goering and Pham show, this component may be implicit rather than explicit, and an orientation to feminist ethics, for example, may enable identifying it. Third, feminist inquiry endorses identifying how academic research can support marginalized groups. Fourth, feminist inquiry develops insights into the functioning of social institutions that may improve the efficacy of philosophers engaged in fieldwork.
