Megan Delehanty (University of Calgary)
Integrating different types of evidence from various techniques and disciplinary perspectives is often a significant epistemic challenge. In general, the greater the overlap between the accepted ontologies, methods, and standards for evidence, the more easily integration can be achieved. Thus, for instance, if a difference in approach can be understood simply in terms of a focus on different levels or properties associated with the phenomenon of interest, methods for integration are likely to succeed. However, if one account of a phenomenon makes use of properties which are not recognized by the account we seek to integrate with it, it is often unclear how to proceed. In this project, I look at the challenges to integrating Western science and indigenous knowledge(s). I identify four significant challenges to this work.
The first challenge is to understand what integration means in this context. Particularly in cases such as this where there are likely to exist significant power differentials, clearly differentiating methods of integration from tools of knowledge assimilation becomes particularly important.
The second challenge is ontological and derives from the presumed inseparability of the empirical and the spiritual in most indigenous epistemologies. Here, careful attention is needed to clarify the nature and role of spiritual components of the belief system. On some interpretations of the “spiritual”, such hybrid epistemologies may present a less significant difference from Western science that we might initially believe. On other interpretations, however, the claim of inseparability requires further analysis to determine the degree to which integration may or may not be impeded.
The third challenge is the failure of most literature in this area to represent science in a way that is recognizable to contemporary philosophers of science. Too often, the picture presented is one that the logical positivists would have endorsed, but that ignores over half a century of more recent work, most notably on anti-reductionism and on science and values. This creates an unnecessary obstacle to integration by presenting Western science as incompatible with systems of knowledge that take a holistic approach and that connect empirical and moral principles.
Finally, the fourth challenge is that some concepts that play key roles in most indigenous epistemologies – such as land and place – rely on particular sorts of lived experience and, thus, present an obstacle to those without the appropriate hermeneutical resources. Together with the first and second challenges, this amplifies the degree to which various forms of epistemic injustice are at play in integration attempts.
