Soohyun Ahn (University of Calgary)
It is often assumed that science aims to discover real divisions of the world, what philosophers call ‘natural kinds.’ Since natural kinds are supposed to be independent of us and useful for our epistemic endeavours, it is thought that value-laden considerations are either irrelevant or harmful in identifying natural kinds. Non-epistemic values, such as social, moral, and political values, are thought to sidetrack the epistemic pursuit of scientific classification, resulting in arbitrary groupings. These assumptions about natural kinds—independence from human interests and the priority of epistemic purposes—are part and parcel of the value-free ideal in science (VFI). Indeed, some philosophers of science have raised a concern over value-driven modifications of natural kind classifications (Griffiths 2004; Khalidi 2013).
The primary concern over value-driven modifications is that the epistemic aim of finding natural kinds is compromised by non-epistemic considerations. In this framework, normative dimensions are thought to divert scientific inquiry from revealing real divisions of the world. For example, Muhammad Ali Khalidi contends that the pursuit of non-epistemic purposes is a threat to social kinds being natural kinds (Khalidi 2013). Thus, he and others argued that the task of disentangling the epistemic from non-epistemic aspects of a category is critical in scientific classification. Khalidi’s suggestion that researchers “be guided by epistemic purposes and not be deflected by non-epistemic interests” is clearly in line with the VFI.
The role of values in science has been discussed among philosophers of science for the last several decades. Much of that debate has focused on the legitimate roles of non-epistemic values in theory choice. There has been little examination of the role of non-epistemic values in scientific classification. By analyzing the case of “infantile autism,” I aim to suggest new argument against the VFI: one shows that non-epistemic considerations can contribute to the epistemic success of scientific categories. The early history of demarcating infantile autism shows that value-laden considerations can positively contribute to the production of scientific knowledge. During the mid-twentieth century, the psychogenic view that the lack of parental warmth was the main cause of the disorder was widely supported by the professional community. The situation was reversed when neurobiological hypotheses were proposed as alternatives (Rimland 1964). This reversal was initiated by a researcher’s commitment to promoting well-being of autistic children and their family. Propelled by value-laden considerations, the search for neurobiological basis of autism opened up a new research area and contributed to classifying autism into a neurodevelopmental disorder. This case study shows that far from epistemically detrimental, value-driven research in scientific classification can be epistemically beneficial and facilitates the process of knowledge production.
