Mara McGuire (Mississippi State University)
Muk Wong (2016) has recently developed a theory of mood and mood function that draws on Laura Sizer’s (2000) computational theory of moods. Sizer argues that moods are higher order functional states, biases in cognitive processes such as attention allocation, memory retrieval, and a mode of information processing. Wong supplements Sizer’s account with one of mood elicitation: what mood is a response to and what function(s) mood serves. Wong claims that mood is a “mechanism” that monitors our energy levels, both mental and physical, in relation to environmental energy demands and, based on this relation, biases our functional states. Based on his account of mood elicitation, Wong next proposes a single function of mood: to maintain an “equilibrium” between our internal energy and the energy requirements of our environment.
I argue that while the need for an account of mood elicitation is well taken, it cannot be understood in terms of a mechanism monitoring energy levels. A theory of mood elicitation must be able to explain the elicitation of different types of moods on different occasions (e.g. anxious, irritable, contented, etc.), that is, why different types of moods are elicited by different events or states of affairs. Understanding mood elicitation along a single dimension, such as the relation between energy level and energy demands, is incapable of doing this. Distinct mood types appear to be more complicated than just differential responses to energy levels and demands. But then Wong’s account of mood function must be rejected. I propose instead that we adopt a multi-dimensional account of mood elicitation. As a first step toward this, I draw upon a different conception of mental energy to Wong’s and argue that mental energy should be expanded to include states of ego-depletion as well as cognitive fatigue (Inzlicht & Berkman 2015). While this more robust account of mental energy increases the explanatory power of Wong’s account, his theory would still not be sufficient to account fully for the elicitation of different types of moods. I then propose that we draw on a related area of affective science, appraisal theories of emotion elicitation, and consider whether important dimensions recognized in these theories, such as “goal relevance and congruence,” “control” and “coping potential” (Moors et al. 2013) are helpful toward understanding the elicitation of moods. I suggest that drawing on these dimensions to start to construct a multi-dimensional account of mood elicitation may explain the elicitation of different types of moods and provide a better foundation for understanding mood function.
