Franklin Jacoby (University of Edinburgh)
Certain kinds of pluralism suggest scientific practice is organised into discrete units with autonomy. Autonomy means one scientific unit of practice cannot be criticised, rejected, or vindicated by another unit. Versions of this view are defended by Chang (2015, 2012). If scientific practice is partitioned in this way, we might ask: how do we or should we determine where the boundaries of a particular practice lie? Chang suggests we do so by grouping scientists by their aims and the activities they perform toward achieving those aims. Longino (2006) along similar lines suggests that the questions investigated by the scientists determine what unit of scientific practice they are members of. The notions that aims, goals, or questions should play a role here is more widespread that just pragmatism. Kusch (2018, 66) also suggests that we use goals (along with beliefs) to distinguish separate epistemic systems that are equally legitimate to the extent that they “cannot be ranked.” These various views suggest that goals play an important and structuring role in scientific practice. Some are also, consequently, committed to a strong form of scientific contingency. This discussion raises the following question: what is the role of goals in science?
I argue that accounts that rely heavily on goals face several issues. I discuss those issues and present an alternative, drawing on literature from the philosophy of language and action, particularly Dummett (1993) and Bratman (1992). I argue that the responsiveness scientists exhibit toward one another’s work should be the means by which we partition scientific practices. Responsiveness suggests a scientist is influenced by and in turn influences another’s work. There are three main upshots of this account: first, it will help clarify when scientists can or should disagree and whether those disagreements are disagreements that can be resolved. Second, this approach places less emphasis on subjective aspects of science and more emphasis on the practice of science, which consequently illuminates how science is structured. Third, partitioning practices based on responsiveness instead of goals can suggest that science is not as contingent as other views suggest. It is worth pointing out that this poster is broadly sympathetic to the pluralist and relativist approaches discussed and also shares the general view Kusch’s relativism takes toward disagreement, i.e. that disagreements are not as deep and fundamental as some accounts suggest.
