Nicholas Alonso (Department of Philosophy Georgia State University and Neuroscience Institute)
The emotions paradox consists of the following two widely held beliefs, which are incompatible but appear true: 1) emotions exist as natural-kinds, and 2) scientists have been unable to produce any natural, objective criteria for classifying emotions (Barrett, 2006, p.27). There have been two main responses to the emotions paradox. The first response is to give up on the natural kinds view of emotions and adopt a constructionist view of emotions. The second response is to hold on to the natural kinds view of emotions and attempt to create new emotion categories which meet the standards for natural kind-hood. Psychologist Lisa Barrett argues that the best approach is to drop the natural kinds view of emotions and opt for constructionism (2006, 2018). In this paper, I argue Barrett holds a faulty view of natural kinds which makes her arguments against the natural kinds view misleading. Consequently, the natural kinds response to the emotions paradox is much more favorable than she makes it out to be.
The problem with Barrett's view has to do with her understanding of subjectivity and natural kinds. Subjective categories are mind-dependent categories that exist in virtue of social agreement (e.g. government), while objective categories are mind-independent categories that exist naturally in the world (e.g. proton). She takes natural kinds (2009) to be objective categories, but this is problematic because certain widely accepted theories of natural kinds, known as homeostatic property cluster theories, allow for certain kinds of subjectivity (see Boyd (1989)).
There are two ways this faulty view of natural kinds is misleading. First, it sets the bar too high for natural kind-hood, making the prospects for developing new emotion categories that meet the standards for natural kinds less promising than it actually is. Second, it leads Barrett to compare emotions to other subjective categories which are clearly not natural kinds, like artifact categories (e.g. muffins, money) and social kinds (government) (2018, 2017,2009). The problem is that not all subjective categories are subjective in the same way. Natural kinds, for instance, are subjective in ways that are different from other subjective categories like money (differences which I explain in detail). And, emotion categories, I argue, are not clearly subjective in the same way as artifact categories and social kinds, and, for this reason, many of her comparisons are misleading. Once these points are made clear, it becomes apparent that the natural kinds response to the emotions paradox is much more favorable than she makes it out to be.
