Michael Nielsen (Columbia University), Rush Stewart
This essay is a corrective to an increasingly popular way to misunderstand Belot's Orgulity Argument. The Orgulity Argument charges Bayesianism with defect as a normative epistemology. For concreteness, we reply to Cisewski et al.'s recent rejoinder to Belot's argument. The conditions that underwrite their version of the argument are too strong and Belot does not endorse them on our reading. A more compelling version of the Orgulity Argument than Cisewski et al. present is available, however---a point that we make by drawing an analogy with de Finetti's argument against mandating countable additivity. Moreover, we show that Elga's strategy of appealing to finitely additive probability to meet the challenge posed by the Orgulity Argument can be extended considerably to meet variations of the challenge.
