Jonathan Tsou (Iowa State University)
This paper addresses the question of how human science categories yield projectable inferences through a critical examination of Ron Mallon's 'social role' account of human kinds. Mallon contends that human categories are causally significant and projectable when a social role produces a homeostatic property cluster (HPC) kind. His account suggests that a human category is projectable when certain social mechanisms serve to stabilize and entrench that category. Contra-Mallon, I argue that human science categories are projectable when a human classification individuates an HPC kind underwritten by natural (i.e., biological) mechanisms. My argument suggests that there is a distinction to be drawn with respect to HPC kinds maintained by social versus natural mechanisms and that only the latter will yield robust projectable inferences. Classifications from psychiatry ('schizophrenia,' 'bipolar disorder,' 'hysteria') are discussed as examples.
