Data, Evidence, and Experiment

Moti Mizrahi (Florida Institute of Technology)
In this paper, I argue that Philosophy of Science faces a methodological problem: philosophers of science frequently appeal to anecdotal evidence, but anecdotal evidence is not good evidence. To show that, I present the results of a systematic survey of the PhilSci-Archive, which suggest that a sizeable proportion of papers in Philosophy of Science contain appeals to anecdotal evidence, as indicated by the occurrence of the indicator words "case study." These results are confirmed by data mined from JSTOR on research articles published in three leading journals in the field: Philosophy of Science, the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (BJPS), and the Journal for General Philosophy of Science (JGPS). The data also show upward trends in appeals to anecdotal evidence in articles published in these journals. I then propose a way to do Philosophy of Science that does not involve appealing to anecdotal evidence, which is exemplified by the research done for this paper.

Ravit Dotan (University of California, Berkeley)
Being sensitive to evidence is very important for the success of epistemic endeavors. However, I argue that resistance to evidence is also important. I start the paper by explaining what resistance is and arguing that it is essential for epistemic endeavors because it protects inquirers from distractions and is conducive to achieving goals of inquiries. Then, I argue that resistance cannot be explained away by conditionalization and is different from having high priors. Last, I suggest thinking about resistance as a non-cognitive attitude. This view sheds light on some scientific disagreements. Moreover, it reveals that resistance is another avenue through which values and other non-epistemic factors shape science.

Irina Mikhalevich (Rochester Institute of Technology)
The classic "Baconian" view holds that science is characterized by experiment and experiment is characterized by active intervention on nature. Many scientific investigations, such as natural experiments, observational studies, model and simulation-based experiments, and preparatory studies, do not involve intervention on the target system and, in that respect, represent prima facie counterexamples to the Baconian view. Here, I argue that non-interventionist experiments may be epistemically on a par with their interventionist counterparts, and ought to be classified therefore as experiment proper.

Melinda Fagan (University of Utah)
We consider philosophy of science in practice as interdisciplinary research, using a long-term project on philosophy of stem cell research as a case study. Results of this project put the philosophical and scientific sides of this project at odds: the philosophical conclusion is that stem cell experiments are doomed to fail on their own terms, with scientists offering a sharp rebuttal. We diagnose this conflict as a cognitive obstacle to interdisciplinarity, grounded in divergent perspectives. We then propose a solution, building on recent work on scientific perspectivism.

Vadim Keyser (California State University, Fresno)
I show that in complex methodological contexts, representational and intervention-based roles require re-conceptualization. I analyze the relations between representation and intervention by focusing on the role of intervention in mediating representations. To do this, first I show how applied scientific practice challenges the simple distinction between representational and intervention-based roles of experiment/measurement. Then I discuss the complex interaction between representation and intervention applied to methodology in biomarker measurement.