Pregnancy, Metaphysics, And Philosophy Of Biology

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Every human is the product of pregnancy: something ubiquitous, utterly familiar and taken for granted but simultaneously exotic, deeply puzzling and philosophically challenging. Philosophers have explored issues related to pregnancy, most obviously abortion and the value and metaphysics of coming into existence, but have paid relatively little attention to the actual biological process of pregnancy. That is a remarkable omission since pregnancy raises many fascinating philosophical questions. This interdisciplinary panel of philosophers and biologist focuses on questions at the level of the organism, at the intersection of metaphysics and philosophy of biology. Mammalian pregnancy involves an intimate relationship between pregnant organism and future offspring that presents, among other things, a "problem of individuality" closer to home than plants or microbes. We aim to develop a biologically informed metaphysics of pregnancy, connecting pregnancy with the philosophy of biology in two directions. Firstly, applying contemporary literature can improve our understanding of pregnancy. Secondly, considering pregnancy may improve our understanding of individuality and of biological laws. Rather than providing the last word, this symposium lays the ground work for the development of a novel research area within the philosophy of science: one with great potential to interact with wider philosophical research.

Biology Symposium

02 Nov 2018 09:00 AM - 11:45 AM(America/Los_Angeles)

Venue : University (Fourth Floor Union Street Tower)

20181102T0900 20181102T1145 America/Los_Angeles Pregnancy, Metaphysics, and Philosophy of Biology Every human is the product of pregnancy: something ubiquitous, utterly familiar and taken for granted but simultaneously exotic, deeply puzzling and philosophically challenging. Philosophers have explored issues related to pregnancy, most obviously abortion and the value and metaphysics of coming into existence, but have paid relatively little attention to the actual biological process of pregnancy. That is a remarkable omission since pregnancy raises many fascinating philosophical questions. This interdisciplinary panel of philosophers and biologist focuses on questions at the level of the organism, at the intersection of metaphysics and philosophy of biology. Mammalian pregnancy involves an intimate relationship between pregnant organism and future offspring that presents, among other things, a "problem of individuality" closer to home than plants or microbes. We aim to develop a biologically informed metaphysics of pregnancy, connecting pregnancy with the philosophy of biology in two directions. Firstly, applying contemporary literature can improve our understanding of pregnancy. Secondly, considering pregnancy may improve our understanding of individuality and of biological laws. Rather than providing the last word, this symposium lays the ground work for the development of a novel research area within the philosophy of science: one with great potential to interact with wider philosophical research. University (Fourth Floor Union Street Tower) PSA2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association office@philsci.org

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Presentations

Evolutionary Versus Physiological Individuals: The Case of Pregnancy

Philosophy of Science 09:00 AM - 09:30 AM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/02 16:00:00 UTC - 2018/11/02 16:30:00 UTC

Grose Jonathan (University of Southampton)
Elselijn Kingma argues that philosophical literature typically adopts a biologically suspect "container" model of pregnancy. She suggests that the maternal-foetal relation is part-whole rather than container-contents. I examine whether support for the part-whole claim can come from philosophical literature on biological individuality. I argue that under an evolutionary approach, mother and foetus are two individuals and hence the part-whole claim is undermined. I then argue that, from a physiological-immunological perspective, the mother-foetus is one individual; hence there is support here for the part-whole thesis. I conclude that pregnancy illustrates that different accounts of individuality can throw up conflicting answers.

Presenters

Pregnancy and the Possibility of Biological Laws

Philosophy of Science 09:30 AM - 10:00 AM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/02 16:30:00 UTC - 2018/11/02 17:00:00 UTC

Laura Franklin-Hall (New York University)
The most prominent single consideration philosophers of biology have offered against the possibility of biological laws comes from John Beatty (1995), who suggests that it is the contingency of evolution that makes it impossible for biological generalizations to provide the counterfactual support that laws must offer. This paper will reply to Beatty's concerns by examining a variety of generalizations that, though not exceptionless, appear true of organisms in lineages with pregnancy, a reproductive tactic that has independently evolved as many as 140 different times across the tree of life.

Presenters

Dividing the Individual

Philosophy of Science 10:15 AM - 10:45 AM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/02 17:15:00 UTC - 2018/11/02 17:45:00 UTC

David Haig (Harvard University)
We divide the flux of life into identifiable things that we call individuals, with beginnings and ends, for pragmatic purposes. One seemingly convenient beginning is the fertilization of an egg by a sperm, but are genetic individuals useful ways to carve nature at the joints in everyday human affairs? Monozygotic twins are a single genetic individual in two bodies. A whole-body chimera is two genetic individuals in one body. Clearly the human individuals to which we want to assign rights and responsibilities are not genetic individuals but much closer to organized human bodies with pleasures, pains, hopes, fears and desires.

Presenters

Reproductive Immunology and the Metaphysics of Pregnancy

Philosophy of Science 10:45 AM - 11:15 AM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/02 17:45:00 UTC - 2018/11/02 18:15:00 UTC

Moira Howes (Trent University)
Immunology was once considered the science of "self-nonself discrimination" and early research in pregnancy immunology was strongly influenced by this view. The accrued evidence, however, supports neither a static definition of self nor a clearly delineated self-nonself boundary. The evidence instead supports a developmental, aggregate, and environmentally integrated self-concept. In this presentation, I consider several implications of this research trajectory for our understanding of pregnancy, maternal-fetal relations, and the self. I also outline several respects in which this dynamic and non-discrete view of selfhood stands to improve the social context of pregnancy, women's health care, and reproductive rights.

Presenters

Pregnant Individuals

Philosophy of Science 11:15 AM - 11:45 AM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/02 18:15:00 UTC - 2018/11/02 18:45:00 UTC

Elselijn Kingma (University of Southampton), Suki Finn (University of Southampton)
Kingma (forthcoming) tentatively argues that fetuses are not merely inside the pregnant organism, but part of it. This raises questions about the status of fetuses and pregnant mammals as individuals. To answer them I compare pregnancy to two other biological phenomena that pose questions for individuality: symbiosis and clonal reproduction. I then defend a positive proposal: we should view the pregnant organism as having a high degree of biological individuality. But it is less of an individual than the non-pregnant mammal.

Presenters

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