Biology 2

Justin Garson (Hunter College, CUNY)
Theories of function are conventionally divided up into historical and ahistorical ones. Proponents of ahistorical theories often cite the ahistoricity of their accounts as a major virtue. Here, I argue that none of the mainstream "ahistorical" accounts are actually ahistorical. All of them embed, implicitly or explicitly, an appeal to history. In Boorse's goal-contribution account, history is latent in the idea of statistical-typicality. In the propensity theory, history is implicit in the idea of a species' natural habitat. In the causal role theory, history is required for making sense of dysfunction. I elaborate some consequences for the functions debate.

Rami Koskinen (University of Helsinki)
Recent critics of multiple realizability have argued that we should concentrate solely on actual here-and-now realizations that are found in nature. The possibility of alternative, but unactualized, realizations is regarded as uninteresting because it is taken to be a question of pure logic or an unverifiable scenario of science fiction. However, in the biological context only a contingent set of realizations are actualized. Drawing on recent work in evolutionary systems and synthetic biology, the paper shows that we can have ways of assessing the modal dimension of multiple realizability that does not have to rely on mere conceivability.

John Matthewson (Massey University)
Populations are ubiquitous in science. However, what counts as a population varies from instance to instance, and they are employed in many different investigative contexts. I present a general framework that is inclusive enough to describe the various kinds of population used in scientific research, while also structured enough to usefully distinguish and systematize the cases appropriately. This descriptive structure can then be used to analyze what makes a population suitable for particular scientific purposes, thus introducing a normative aspect to the framework.

Aaron Novick (University of Pittsburgh)
Evolutionary-developmental biology (evo-devo) is often claimed to mark a return of typological thinking to evolutionary biology, in part due to its emphasis on deep conservation of body plans. I argue that the basis of evo-devo's explanation of deep conservation is not typological thinking but Cuvieran functionalism. I show that Cuvieran functionalism complements rather than conflicts with mainstream evolutionary theorizing.