Epistemic Injustice in Science

Inkeri Koskinen (University of Helsinki), Kristina Rolin (University of Helsinki)
Whereas much of the literature in the social epistemology of scientific knowledge has focused either on scientific communities or research groups, we examine the epistemic significance of scientific/intellectual movements (SIMs). We argue that certain types of SIMs can play an important epistemic role in science: they can remedy epistemic injustices in scientific practices. SIMs can counteract epistemic injustices effectively because many forms of epistemic injustice require structural and not merely individual remedies. To illustrate our argument, we discuss the case of Indigenous Studies.

Anke Bueter (Leibniz Universität Hannover)
My paper supports calls for an increased integration of patients into taxonomic decision-making in psychiatry by arguing that their exclusion constitutes a special kind of epistemic injustice: Pre-emptive testimonial injustice, which precludes the opportunity for testimony due to a presumed irrelevance or lack of expertise. This presumption is misguided for two reasons: (1) the role of values in psychiatric classification and (2) the potential function of first-person knowledge as a corrective means against implicitly value-laden, inaccurate, or incomplete diagnostic criteria sets. This kind of epistemic injustice leads to preventable epistemic losses in the practices of psychiatric classification, diagnosis, or treatment.

Christopher ChoGlueck (Indiana University-Bloomington)
Earlier this year, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) announced a new division to protect providers in their right to refuse patients with certain services they deem objectionable such as abortifacients and contraceptives.  This raises several jointly ethical-epistemic questions: which values and whose values are legitimate within women’s reproductive health? How should our institutions be structured accordingly?  I concentrate on zygote-centric values, a sexist ideology that focuses the attention of scientists and healthcare professionals away from women and toward fertilized embryos (zygotes).  I do so by analyzing how the FDA’s labeling about the morning-after pill’s mechanism was laden with zygote-centric values. I then argue that our knowledge and epistemic practices should not commit epistemic injustices. Nonetheless, this drug label led to epistemic injustices because its sexist value-ladenness enabled sex-based oppression. Therefore, I conclude that these oppressive values are illegitimate within women’s reproductive health, at least prima facie.  This paper provides philosophers of science with a novel solution to the problem of value legitimacy.  It also contributes a novel form of epistemic injustice to social epistemology and develops the epistemic dimensions of feminist moral philosophy.

Darcy McCusker (University of Washington)
In this paper, I will show that gendered citation practices constitute a participatory epistemic injustice because they prevent female scientists from fully engaging in the epistemic practices of science. I also wish to draw attention to the cumulative nature of this and other participatory epistemic injustices; while it may be that any particular instance of an author failing to cite the appropriate author due to a prejudicial belief constitutes a harm, there is a larger harm that comes from the community level biases that prevent particular groups from engaging in the practices of science.