A significant amount of evidence shows that laypeople often hold beliefs that are inconsistent with current scientific knowledge - thus there is a gap between science and the public on such matters. This gap is not only of epistemic relevance, but because the failure to believe certain scientific claims can also have important effects on people's behaviors, it has ramifications for public policy decisions. Consequently understanding what forces give rise to this gap and strategizing means to address it are both philosophically and pragmatically important. While there are doubtlessly a variety of complex factors, recent arguments have focused on the role of epistemically detrimental or normatively inappropriate dissent in producing misinformation and confusion in the publics' beliefs (Biddle and Leuschner, 2015, Oreskes and Conway, 2010). Consequently, strategies such as distinguishing legitimate from problematic dissent (Leuschner 2015) and/or publicizing the existence of scientific consensus when it exists have been emphasized (Cook et al. 2013; Cook et al. 2016). The proposed symposium provides a forum for examining other factors and considering alternate strategies through which to bridge the gap.
A significant amount of evidence shows that laypeople often hold beliefs that are inconsistent with current scientific knowledge - thus there is a gap between science and the public on such matters. This gap is not only of epistemic relevance, but because the failure to believe certain scientific claims can also have important effects on people's behaviors, it has ramifications for public policy decisions. Consequently understanding what forces give rise to this gap and strategizing means to address it are both philosophically and pragmatically important. While there are doubtlessly a variety of complex factors, recent arguments have focused on the role of epistemically detrimental or normatively inappropriate dissent in producing misinformation and confusion in the publics' beliefs (Biddle and Leuschner, 2015, Oreskes and Conway, 2010). Consequently, strategies such as distinguishing legitimate from problematic dissent (Leuschner 2015) and/or publicizing the existence of scientific consensus when it exists have been emphasized (Cook et al. 2013; Cook et al. 2016). The proposed symposium provides a forum for examining other factors and considering alternate strategies through which to bridge the gap.
University (Fourth Floor Union Street Tower) PSA2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association office@philsci.orgTechnical Issues?
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