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Social and Individual Norms for Values in Science

Session Information

Some theories of values in science emphasize the sociality of scientific knowledge and provide normative guidance only for the social processes by which social knowledge is produced. Others emphasize guidelines for individual scientists and research groups. Such accounts may be in tension with each other. For instance, individual-level norms that emphasize making good value judgments may interfere with social-level norms that prescribe increasing diversity and unrestricted pluralism of values. Such tensions must be avoided, managed, or reconciled. Science needs normative guidance at both levels, and we need some degree of coordination between the two, at least to the point where the two levels of norms do not provide guidance that is conflicting or unproductively in tension. This symposium will investigate questions such as: How do we distinguish individual from social norms for values in science? To what extent do norms at the two levels need to be coordinated? Are the norms at the two levels connected by more basic norms or values? Where conflicts emerge, is there a systematic way of managing or resolving them? Can there be productive tensions between the two levels?

02 Nov 2018 03:45 PM - 05:45 PM(America/Los_Angeles)
Venue : Jefferson A (Fourth Floor Union Street Tower)
20181102T1545 20181102T1745 America/Los_Angeles Social and Individual Norms for Values in Science

Some theories of values in science emphasize the sociality of scientific knowledge and provide normative guidance only for the social processes by which social knowledge is produced. Others emphasize guidelines for individual scientists and research groups. Such accounts may be in tension with each other. For instance, individual-level norms that emphasize making good value judgments may interfere with social-level norms that prescribe increasing diversity and unrestricted pluralism of values. Such tensions must be avoided, managed, or reconciled. Science needs normative guidance at both levels, and we need some degree of coordination between the two, at least to the point where the two levels of norms do not provide guidance that is conflicting or unproductively in tension. This symposium will investigate questions such as: How do we distinguish individual from social norms for values in science? To what extent do norms at the two levels need to be coordinated? Are the norms at the two levels connected by more basic norms or values? Where conflicts emerge, is there a systematic way of managing or resolving them? Can there be productive tensions between the two levels?

Jefferson A (Fourth Floor Union Street Tower) PSA2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association office@philsci.org

Presentations

Values as Evidence

Philosophy of Science 03:45 PM - 04:15 PM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/02 22:45:00 UTC - 2018/11/02 23:15:00 UTC
Sharyn Clough (Oregon State University)
I argue that sexist/racist values can be understood as beliefs that are poorly supported empirically and that many values identified as feminist are beliefs that are well-supported empirically. Thus sexist/racist values should be excluded from scientific hypotheses and where relevant, feminist values should be included. My claims apply also at the institutional-level, including hiring and publishing. Evaluating job candidates or manuscripts is a kind of hypothesis-testing. In sum we should expand our understanding of what counts as the kinds of empirical evidence to which scientists ought be responsive, expanding it to include values, at both the individual and institutional level.
Presenters
SC
Sharyn Clough
Phronesis Lab, School Of History, Philosophy, And Religion, OSU

Knowledge: Individually Responsible, Collectively Justified

Philosophy of Science 04:15 PM - 04:45 PM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/02 23:15:00 UTC - 2018/11/02 23:45:00 UTC
Boaz Miller (Zefat Academic College)
While philosophers of science formulate conditions for communal knowledge, they say little about when an individual member of an epistemic community knows. I argue that an individual member knows when she responsibly does what is practicably possible to have a true belief. Responsibility is delimited by role-expectations, while practicability is delimited by her competencies, technological, ethical, and economic circumstances. Additionally, the available evidence within a subject's scientific community must support her belief given a legitimate weighing of inductive risks. My account can distinguish cases an expert testifies from knowledge from cases she expresses mere speculation or personal opinion.
Presenters
BM
Boaz Miller
Zefat Academic College

Moral Imagination as Individual and Social Ideal for Values in Science

Philosophy of Science 04:45 PM - 05:15 PM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/02 23:45:00 UTC - 2018/11/03 00:15:00 UTC
Matthew Brown (University of Texas, Dallas)
I defend a new approach to values in science, the ideal of moral imagination, and show how it coordinates norms for science at the level of individuals, collectives, and social interactions. According to this ideal, scientists should recognize contingencies in their research, creatively explore options for settling them, empathetically understand potential stakeholders, and recognize the relevant values; on this basis they should make decisions that integrate social/ethical and epistemic considerations. I will sketch the way this ideal plays out in individual and collective decision-making in science and in the interactions of science with its social context.
Presenters Matthew Brown
Center For Values In Medicine, Science, And Technology At The University Of Texas At Dallas

The Aims of Science and Responsible Research

Philosophy of Science 05:15 PM - 05:45 PM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/03 00:15:00 UTC - 2018/11/03 00:45:00 UTC
Heather Douglas (Michigan State University)
What are the proper aims of science? With concerns over dual-use research and the commercialization of science, neither truth nor significant truth are adequate responses. Rising demands for responsible innovation have raised the bar. This talk will address this question through the lens of two distinctions: 1) between individual and communal norms and 2) between minimum floors of acceptable choices and ideals for which choices might aim. I will argue that the minimums and ideals for the scientific community as a whole are more demanding that the minimums and ideals for scientists as individuals, producing an important and productive misalignment.
Presenters
HD
Heather Douglas
Michigan State University
895 visits

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Session speakers, moderators & attendees
Zefat Academic College
Michigan State University
Center for Values in Medicine, Science, and Technology at the University of Texas at Dallas
Phronesis Lab, School of History, Philosophy, and Religion, OSU
University of Pittsburgh
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