Some theories of values in science emphasize the sociality of scientific knowledge and provide normative guidance only for the social processes by which social knowledge is produced. Others emphasize guidelines for individual scientists and research groups. Such accounts may be in tension with each other. For instance, individual-level norms that emphasize making good value judgments may interfere with social-level norms that prescribe increasing diversity and unrestricted pluralism of values. Such tensions must be avoided, managed, or reconciled. Science needs normative guidance at both levels, and we need some degree of coordination between the two, at least to the point where the two levels of norms do not provide guidance that is conflicting or unproductively in tension. This symposium will investigate questions such as: How do we distinguish individual from social norms for values in science? To what extent do norms at the two levels need to be coordinated? Are the norms at the two levels connected by more basic norms or values? Where conflicts emerge, is there a systematic way of managing or resolving them? Can there be productive tensions between the two levels?
Some theories of values in science emphasize the sociality of scientific knowledge and provide normative guidance only for the social processes by which social knowledge is produced. Others emphasize guidelines for individual scientists and research groups. Such accounts may be in tension with each other. For instance, individual-level norms that emphasize making good value judgments may interfere with social-level norms that prescribe increasing diversity and unrestricted pluralism of values. Such tensions must be avoided, managed, or reconciled. Science needs normative guidance at both levels, and we need some degree of coordination between the two, at least to the point where the two levels of norms do not provide guidance that is conflicting or unproductively in tension. This symposium will investigate questions such as: How do we distinguish individual from social norms for values in science? To what extent do norms at the two levels need to be coordinated? Are the norms at the two levels connected by more basic norms or values? Where conflicts emerge, is there a systematic way of managing or resolving them? Can there be productive tensions between the two levels?
Jefferson A (Fourth Floor Union Street Tower) PSA2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association office@philsci.orgTechnical Issues?
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