What, if Anything, is Fundamental about Physics

Physics is often said to be fundamental with respect to the rest of science but it is not clear what this means. Certainly, the theories of the rest of science cannot be derived from physical theory. Twentieth century philosophy of science demonstrated the untenability of various forms of reductionism. However, the view that all sciences are on a par and that physics is just one among a number of special science overlooks respects in which physics is different from all other sciences. The aim of this symposium is to analyze through a twenty-first century lens what special status, if any, physics may have with respect to other branches of science and modes of inquiry. This is important if the large sums of money and resources some of the most important work in fundamental physics requires is justified. We look at what may be said to defend the special status of physics from the perspective of the physicist, philosopher of science, and metaphysician.