Imagination in Science

Fiora Salis (University of York)
How do we learn through the scientific imagination involved in scientific models? I distinguish between two sorts of claims scientists can make within the modelling practice, claims about the imaginary system the model describes and claims about reality. The former raises the problem of how the claims generated within such imaginary scenarios might be justified, whereas the latter raises the problem of how the imagination might be constrained so as to generate potentially true claims about reality. I will argue that the key to solving both problems is in a particular account of make-believe drawn from the study of fiction.

Alice Murphy (University of Leeds)
Mental model accounts of thought experiments are grounded in research in cognitive science on constructing and manipulating "structural analogues" of real world events in problem solving tasks. These accounts highlight the crucial role of the imagination in scientific thought experiments. However, an issue remains unresolved: is the nature of the imagination (always) imagistic, or can the theory accommodate cases where the productivity of the imagination is restricted to a propositional kind? I argue this must be settled if the mental model view is to provide a forceful push against Norton's eliminativism. As it stands, it's not a useful alternative.

Michael Stuart (London School of Economics)
Imagination is part of the scientist's toolbox, but it is unlike the other tools. In experiment, mathematical reasoning, computer simulation, etc., we mostly try to filter out random fluctuations and unpredictable or uncontrolled events. But we would not recommend the same for imagination. Indeed, part of its power comes from its particular lack of regimentation; it is only in imagination we are encouraged to ignore what we know. In this paper I argue that cognitive science-based epistemologies of scientific imagination cannot account for this kind of epistemic luck. As a result, these accounts must introduce an element of epistemological anarchy.

Steven French (University of Leeds)
Are the nature and role of imagination in science the same as that in art? Here I explore this question in the context of scientific discovery. On the one hand, contrary to recent accounts of imagination in fiction, the relevant attitude in science seems closer to that of belief. On the other, the constraints exemplified in the former play a similar role to heuristic factors evidenced in the latter. I shall present a framework that offers the possibility of a unitary approach to imagination in both cases, which illustrates what they have in common whilst acknowledging where they diverge.