The Origins Of Convention And The Impact Of Conventional Origins

Loading Session...

Session Information

Whether social institutions, behavioral norms, languages, or moral principles have conventional origins, and what implications such origins have, are broadly philosophical concerns. Formal work in philosophy of science and economics, in particular the expansion and extension of Lewis (1969) by Skyrms (1996/2014, 2004, 2010) or the seminal work by Young (1993, 1998), has shed new light on the evolutionary origins of convention. We plan to connect these two philosophical issues by jointly exploring contemporary approaches to the origins of convention and how the that work informs origin explanations of more complex social, linguistic, and moral behavior. In short, we aim to provide (partial) answers to two questions: How do conventional origin explanations work? And, what do they mean for richer accounts of social practices?

Social Science Symposium

03 Nov 2018 09:00 AM - 11:45 AM(America/Los_Angeles)

Venue : Diamond A (First Floor)

20181103T0900 20181103T1145 America/Los_Angeles The Origins of Convention and the Impact of Conventional Origins Whether social institutions, behavioral norms, languages, or moral principles have conventional origins, and what implications such origins have, are broadly philosophical concerns. Formal work in philosophy of science and economics, in particular the expansion and extension of Lewis (1969) by Skyrms (1996/2014, 2004, 2010) or the seminal work by Young (1993, 1998), has shed new light on the evolutionary origins of convention. We plan to connect these two philosophical issues by jointly exploring contemporary approaches to the origins of convention and how the that work informs origin explanations of more complex social, linguistic, and moral behavior. In short, we aim to provide (partial) answers to two questions: How do conventional origin explanations work? And, what do they mean for richer accounts of social practices? Diamond A (First Floor) PSA2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association office@philsci.org

Add to my Schedule

Presentations

Convention and the Nature of Institutions

Philosophy of Science 09:00 AM - 09:30 AM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/03 16:00:00 UTC - 2018/11/03 16:30:00 UTC

Brian Epstein (Tufts University)
Prevailing economic theories of institutions and organizations treat them as rational solutions to strategic problems of interaction and coordination. In this paper, I argue against this approach to institutions, and in particular against the idea that institutions be understood as social conventions. I use the grounding-anchoring model in social ontology to analyze convention, and argue that that it is misleading to understand conventions in terms of structured attitudes or as strategic coordination devices. I further argue that only the rare instance of social institutions is conventional.

Presenters

Conflict, Convention, and the Origins of Ownership

Philosophy of Science 09:30 AM - 10:00 AM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/03 16:30:00 UTC - 2018/11/03 17:00:00 UTC

Rory Smead (Northeastern University), Patrick Forber (Tufts University)
Are ownership norms conventional? And if so, why are they so prevalent? A conventional origin for a norm, behavior, or social practice often contrasts with an explanation that appeals to intrinsic values or superior payoffs. To be conventional is to lack any systematic strategic or adaptive edge over alternative behaviors. Here we explore the merit of this way of thinking by focusing on a proposal about conventional origin of ownership norms. The classic explanation needs to be revised, and that revision raises new possibilities about the origins of norms surrounding ownership that may apply broadly to biological and cultural evolution.

Presenters

Co-Authors

Cultural Evolution of Conventions: Empirical Examples at the Macro and Micro Level

Philosophy of Science 10:15 AM - 10:45 AM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/03 17:15:00 UTC - 2018/11/03 17:45:00 UTC

Fiona Jordan (University of Bristol)
Social scientists who seek explanations for the foundations of social norms and conventions must engage with primary data: the diversity of contemporary and ethnographically-attested cultural phenomena. Explaining cultural diversity requires a multi-level approach in order to connect any proposed foundations or origins to their manifestations across thousands of human cultural groups. Cultural evolutionary approaches allow us to use the tools of evolutionary analysis in a variety of empirical paradigms to understand the trajectories of change in human social and cultural norms. Here I describe two research projects that can inform the space of possibilities for conventions of any kind.

Presenters

Convention: Equilibrium-in-Beliefs or Dynamical Limit?

Philosophy of Science 10:45 AM - 11:15 AM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/03 17:45:00 UTC - 2018/11/03 18:15:00 UTC

Peter Vanderschraaf (University of California, Merced)
Conventions are often analyzed via an equilibrium-in-beliefs approach or a dynamical limit approach. A purely equilibrium-in-beliefs analysis can only explain the origins of a convention with reference to higher-order coordinated beliefs, threatening a vicious regress. A dynamical limit analysis at best explains the origins of basic conventions of one-shot games, while many important conventions are history-dependent conventions of repeated games. I argue that a new theory of convention is called for where coordinated beliefs and dynamical updating interact. I show by example how a convention can be both an equilibrium-in-beliefs and the limit of a dynamical inductive learning process.

Presenters

Inequality and Inequity in the Emergence of Norms

Philosophy of Science 11:15 AM - 11:45 AM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/03 18:15:00 UTC - 2018/11/03 18:45:00 UTC

Calvin Cochran (University of California, Irvine), Cailin O'Connor (University of California, Irvine)
Many societies have state norms of equity---that those who make symmetric social contributions deserve symmetric rewards. Despite this, there are widespread patterns of social inequity, especially along gender and racial lines. It is often the case that members of certain social groups receive greater rewards per contribution than others. In this paper, we draw on evolutionary game theory to show that the emergence of this sort of inequitable convention is far from surprising. In simple cultural evolutionary models, inequity is much more likely to emerge than equity, despite the presence of stable, equitable outcomes that groups might instead learn.

Presenters

Co-Authors