Values in Science 2

Samuel Hall (University of Notre Dame)
I offer a new taxonomy of values in science, clarifying and rejecting an epistemic/non-epistemic distinction in favor of distinguishing between cognitive values, characteristics of theories, and conative values, valued ends. The set of cognitive values is a function of the conative value guiding scientific inquiry. Cognitive values serve as reasons to commit to a theory while conative values dictate the norms of inquiry, conditioning the evaluation of evidential support and methodological standards of research. This value-directed view respects the motivating concern behind the value-free ideal, namely, avoidance of self-confirming belief in any particular scientific theory.

Sarah Roe (Southern Connecticut State University)
Within this paper, I utilize Feyerabend's work to better understand the new citizen scientist movement, namely the utilization of nonscientists for certain scientific tasks. Feyerabend teaches us that while the current citizen science movement is primarily focused on what the citizen can do for science and what the citizen can learn from science, the movement should also focus on what science can do for the citizen and what science can learn from the citizen. Feyerabend may offer us a better understanding of how citizen science can best promote scientific education, offer broader knowledge to participants, increase citizen interest in conservation and policy, increase both citizen local and national engagement, and promote a rewarding experience for both the expert and citizen.

Daria Jadreškić (Leibniz Universität Hannover)
I examine the role of time-sensitivity in science by drawing on a discussion between Kevin Elliott and Daniel McKaughan (2014) and Daniel Steel (2016), on the role of non-epistemic values in theory assessment and the epistemic status of speed of inference. I argue that: 1) speed supervenes on ease of use in the cases they discuss, 2) speed is an epistemic value, and 3) Steel's account of values (2010) doesn't successfully distinguish extrinsically epistemic from non-epistemic values. Finally, I propose an account of time-sensitivity.

Donal Khosrowi (Durham University), Julian Reiss (Durham University)
This paper has three sections. Section 1 advances a novel critique of 'evidence-based policy'. The core of the critique is that the demand that policies be 'evidence-based', when this involves preferences for specific methods to generate such evidence, can and often will result in inferior policy outcomes. Section 2 illustrates this by means of three brief case studies which focus on matters of distributive justice. Section 3 offers some proposals for how philosophers of science can contribute to improving methodology for evidence- based policy.