Trust and the Public

David Hopf (Leibniz Universität Hannover)
The intersection of science with society at large, and, more specifically, the issue of public trust in science as a provider of information has recently become a topic of great interest to a wide variety of disciplines and institutions. In this paper, I motivate the idea that, when concerned with public epistemic trust in science, we should focus on the state of research as opposed to individual scientific claims. I present a general framework for assessing trustworthiness, apply it to science as a provider of information, and argue that trustworthiness concerning the state of research is irreducible to individual findings.

S. Andrew Schroeder (Claremont McKenna College)
There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that core parts of the scientific process require an appeal to non-epistemic values. This undermines the traditional foundation for public trust in science. In this paper I consider two proposals for justifying public trust in value-laden science. According to the first, scientists can promote trust by being transparent about their value choices. On the second, trust requires that the values of a scientist align with the values of an individual member of the public. I argue that neither of these proposals work and suggest an alternative that may do better: when scientists must appeal to values in the course of their research, they should appeal to democratic values, the values of the public or its representatives.

Rebecca Korf (University of Montana)
Criticism of the value-free ideal has motivated attempts to formulate a criterion for the legitimacy of non-epistemic value influence in science. I argue that this search aims to protect two main components of legitimacy, scientific integrity and justice. While integrity is primary, justice remains important, especially in setting scientific goals. One of the main proposals for setting legitimate goals is to rely on democratic endorsement (Intemann 2015). I critically assess four interpretations of this criterion, finding that all are problematic. I then propose and evaluate three alternative models that seek to better balance respect for the public with scientific expertise.

Cristian Larroulet Philippi (University of Colorado, Boulder)
One area of science where the collective good is particularly at stake is science's research agenda. But which is that collective good that science's research agenda should promote? Kitcher has provided an ideal account: well-ordered science (WOS). Against criticism regarding WOS's lack of capacity for guiding action, Kitcher advises not to confuse ideals and the ways to arrive at them (2002, 2011). Here I argue the problem remains even under that distinction. Kitcher understands WOS as a hypothetical procedure, the answers of which we should aim at. I show that, since those answers cannot be known, WOS provides no ideal SRA as benchmark. Thus, it cannot guide action.