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Understanding and the Aims of Science

Session Information

Scientific understanding is increasingly focal as a topic in its own right, distinct from questions about scientific explanation. In this session, we tackle the issue of what the nature of scientific understanding indicates about the aims of science, especially its epistemic aim(s). Each session participant has published a book in 2017 that develops a view of the aims of science with understanding at the center. Yet, the differences among the resulting views are significant. A central point of disagreement regards the role of falsehoods in providing understanding, most notably idealizations, and the epistemic value of such falsehoods. Some contributors take idealizations and other falsehoods to show that accuracy cannot be science's aim; others believe these falsehoods are justified merely by their instrumental epistemic value. This relates to a second important point of disagreement: whether pluralism about scientific aims and methods results chiefly from pragmatic considerations, epistemic considerations, or some combination thereof. This exchange will help define the lay of the land for positions regarding the nature of scientific understanding and its relationship to other putative aims of science.

03 Nov 2018 03:45 PM - 05:45 PM(America/Los_Angeles)
Venue : Ballard (Third Floor)
20181103T1545 20181103T1745 America/Los_Angeles Understanding and the Aims of Science

Scientific understanding is increasingly focal as a topic in its own right, distinct from questions about scientific explanation. In this session, we tackle the issue of what the nature of scientific understanding indicates about the aims of science, especially its epistemic aim(s). Each session participant has published a book in 2017 that develops a view of the aims of science with understanding at the center. Yet, the differences among the resulting views are significant. A central point of disagreement regards the role of falsehoods in providing understanding, most notably idealizations, and the epistemic value of such falsehoods. Some contributors take idealizations and other falsehoods to show that accuracy cannot be science's aim; others believe these falsehoods are justified merely by their instrumental epistemic value. This relates to a second important point of disagreement: whether pluralism about scientific aims and methods results chiefly from pragmatic considerations, epistemic considerations, or some combination thereof. This exchange will help define the lay of the land for positions regarding the nature of scientific understanding and its relationship to other putative aims of science.

Ballard (Third Floor) PSA2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association office@philsci.org

Presentations

Scientific Understanding and Epistemic Values

Philosophy of Science 03:45 PM - 04:15 PM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/03 22:45:00 UTC - 2018/11/03 23:15:00 UTC
Henk de Regt (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
The understanding that comes with scientific explanation is regarded as one of the central epistemic aims of science. In my Understanding Scientific Understanding (OUP, 2017) I have argued that scientists achieve understanding of phenomena by basing their explanations on intelligible theories, where intelligibility relates to scientists' abilities: theories are intelligible if scientists have the skills to use those theories in fruitful ways. In this paper, I address the question of how the aim of understanding relates to other epistemic aims of science, and compare my account of these aims to the views of my co-symposiasts.
Presenters
HD
Henk De Regt
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Models in Scientific Understanding

Philosophy of Science 04:15 PM - 04:45 PM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/03 23:15:00 UTC - 2018/11/03 23:45:00 UTC
Catherine Elgin (Harvard University)
To understand a topic is to reflectively endorse a systematic, interconnected network of epistemic commitments in reflective equilibrium where that network is grounded in fact, is duly responsive to evidence, and enables non-trivial inference, argument, and perhaps action bearing on that topic. Such understanding is holistic and non-factive. Models are felicitous falsehoods that organize, filter, and synthesize vast amounts of diverse information. Even an omniscient God would do well to deploy idealized models if she wanted to understand the patterns and regularities of fluid dynamics or population biology.
Presenters
CE
Catherine Elgin
Harvard University

Idealization and Many Aims

Philosophy of Science 04:45 PM - 05:15 PM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/03 23:45:00 UTC - 2018/11/04 00:15:00 UTC
Angela Potochnik (University of Cincinnati)
I motivate the idea that scientific understanding is often directly benefited from the inclusion of false posits, i.e. idealizations. This is because researchers' specific aims influence what generates the cognitive state of understanding. Accordingly, genuine understanding is promoted by idealizing difference-makers that are unimportant to researchers' immediate interests. This view predicts a continuing variety of representations of any given phenomenon, each indexed to a highly specific aim. I consider a challenge to these ideas based on two popular and related ideas: that understanding is factive, and that it is an objective matter how explanations should represent the world.
Presenters
AP
Angela Potochnik
University Of Cincinnati

Accuracy, Understanding, and the Aims of Science

Philosophy of Science 05:15 PM - 05:45 PM (America/Los_Angeles) 2018/11/04 00:15:00 UTC - 2018/11/04 00:45:00 UTC
Kareem Khalifa (Middlebury College)
Accuracy monism is the idea that accurate representation (paradigmatically: the acquisition of true beliefs and the avoidance of false beliefs) is the only ultimate epistemic aim of scientific inquiry. Arguments against it are threefold. First, past inquiries that resulted in false beliefs but advanced our understanding are episodes of scientific progress. Second, scientists' use of idealizations suggests that some falsehoods are cognitively valuable because they advance our understanding. Third, inquiries that aim at truths that do not advance our understanding appear deficient or misguided. I defend accuracy monism against these three objections.
Presenters Kareem Khalifa
Middlebury College
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Session Participants

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Session speakers, moderators & attendees
University of Cincinnati
Harvard University
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Middlebury College
Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis
Pantheon-Sorbonne University
 Martin Zach
Charles University
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